Stochastic sequential bargaining games (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in various …elds including political economy and macroeconomics due to their ‡exibility in explaining delays in reaching agreement. In this paper, we present new results in nonparametric identi…cation of such models under di¤erent scenarios of data availability. First, with complete data on players'decisions, the sizes of the surplus to be shared (cakes) and the agreed allocations, both the mapping from states to the total surplus (i.e. the "cake function") and the players'common discount rate are identi…ed, if the unobservable state variable (USV) is independent of observable ones (OSV), and the total surplus is strictly increasing in the USV conditional on the OSV. Second, when the cake size is only observed under agreements and is additively separable in OSV and USV, the contribution by OSV is identi…ed provided the USV distribution satis…es some distributional exclusion restrictions. Third, if data only report when an agreement is reached but never report the cake sizes, we propose a simple algorithm that exploits exogenously given shape restrictions on the cake function and the independence of USV from OSV to recover all rationalizable probabilities for reaching an agreement under counterfactual state transitions. Numerical examples show the set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes so recovered can be informative.
Introduction
Starting with the seminal contributions of Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982) , noncooperative (or strategic) bargaining theory has ‡ourished in the last thirty years. The original model of bilateral bargaining with alternating o¤ers and complete information has been extended in a number of directions allowing for more general extensive forms, information structure and more than two players (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein (1992) for surveys). The development of the theoretical literature has gone hand in hand with, and for a large part has been motivated by, the broad range of applications of bargaining models. These include labor, family, legal, housing, political, and international negotiations (see, e.g., Muthoo (1999) ). The increased availability of data on the outcomes of such negotiations as well as on the details of the bargaining process has also stimulated a surge in empirical work, where casual empiricism has progressively lead the way to more systematic attempts to take strategic bargaining models to data. 2 A theoretical framework that has been extensively used in empirical applications is the stochastic bargaining model proposed by Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) . In this model, the surplus to be allocated (or the "cake") and the bargaining protocol (i.e., the order in which players can make o¤ers and countero¤ers), are allowed to evolve over time according to a stochastic process. This feature makes the model ‡exible (it provides a uni…ed framework for a large class of bargaining games), and rationalizes the occurrence of delays in reaching agreement, which are often observed in actual negotiations, in bargaining environments with complete information. Moreover, for the case where players share a common discount factor and their utility is linear in the amount of surplus they receive (which we refer to as the "canonical model"), the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there are only two players bargaining, and a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) when negotiations are multilateral. The unique equilibrium admitted by the model is stochastic and characterized by the solution of a …xed-point problem which can be easily computed. For all these reasons, the stochastic bargaining framework naturally lends itself to estimation and has been used in a variety of empirical applications that range from the formation of coalition governments in parliamentary democracy (Merlo (1997) , Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) ), to collective bargaining agreements (Diaz-Moreno and Galdon (2000)), to corporate bankruptcy reorganizations (Eraslan (2008) ), to the setting of industry standards in product markets (Simcoe (2008) ), and to sovereign debt renegotiations (Benjamin and Wright (2008) , Bi (2008) ).
To date, the existing literature on the structural estimation of noncooperative bargaining models has been entirely parametric. In addition to the body of work cited above based on the stochastic framework, other bargaining models have also been speci…ed and parametrically estimated using a variety of data sets. 3 However, little is known about whether the structural elements of these models or the bargaining outcomes in a counterfactual environment can be identi…ed without imposing parametric assumptions. This paper contributes to the literature on the estimation of sequential bargaining models by providing positive results in the nonparametric identi…cation of stochastic bargaining models. Our work is not intended to advocate the complete removal of parametric assumptions on the primitives of these models in structural estimations, as in most cases such assumptions are instrumental for attaining point-identi…cation and can be tested. Rather, our main objective is to understand the limit of what can be learned about the model structure and rationalizable counterfactual outcomes when researchers wish to remain agnostic about unknown structural elements of the model. 4 Empirical contexts of stochastic bargaining games may di¤er in what the econometricians observe in the data. These di¤erences will in general have important implications on identi…cation of the model structures. Here, we consider three scenarios with increasing data limitations. We refer to these scenarios as "complete data" (where econometricians observe the total surplus to be allocated or "the size of the cake" in each period regardless of whether an agreement is reached), "incomplete data with censored cake sizes" (where econometricians only observe the size of the cake in the period when an agreement is reached), and "incomplete data with unobservable cake sizes"(where econometricians only observe the timing of agreement, but never observe the value of the surplus). To illustrate the three data scenarios and introduce some useful notation, consider, for example, a situation where a group of investors decide to dissolve their partnership and bargain over how to divide a portfolio they jointly own. The size of the cake is the market value of the portfolio which is determined by state variables, such as market or macroeconomic conditions, that evolve over time according to a stochastic process. The investors share the same discount factor which is the market interest rate. Certain state variables that a¤ect the market value of the portfolio are observed by both the investors and the econometricians (OSV), while other state variables are only known to the investors but not observed by the econometricians (USV). In the complete data scenario, the econometricians observe the evolution of the market value of the portfolio at all dates throughout the negotiation. This situation would arise for example if the portfolio is entirely composed of publicly traded stocks. In the second scenario, the econometricians only observe the with uncommon priors, respectively, to study the timing and terms of medical malpractice dispute resolutions. Merlo, Ortalo-Magne and Rust (2009) estimate a bargaining model with incomplete information to study the timing and terms of residential real estate transactions. 4 In this respect, our work is related to the growing literature on nonparametric identi…cation and tests of empirical auction models, pioneered by La¤ont and Vuong (1996) , Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Athey and Haile (2002) , Haile and Tamer (2003) , Haile, Hong and Shum (2004) , Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003) . A recent paper by Chiappori and Donni (2006) also addresses related questions in the context of a static, cooperative (or axiomatic) bargaining framework and derives su¢ cient conditions on the auxiliary assumptions of the model under which the Nash bargaining solution generates testable restrictions. We do not review the (theoretical or empirical) literature on cooperative bargaining here since it is outside of the scope of this paper. market value of the portfolio when an agreement is reached but not in any other period during the negotiation. This would be the case if for example the portfolio is composed of non-publicly traded securities, but the sale price is recorded. Finally, in the third scenario with the least data, the econometricians only observe the timing of agreements but never observe the market value of the portfolio. This would be the case if for example the only available information is when a partnership is dissolved but the details of the settlement are kept con…dential (e.g., because of a court order).
Under each of the three data scenarios described above, we provide conditions that attain positive results in the identi…cation of model structures or counterfactuals for the canonical model of stochastic bargaining. With complete data, we show that the common discount factor can be uniquely recovered from the distribution of cake sizes and the occurrence of agreements, if the USV and the order of moves are independent of history conditional on the current OSV. Furthermore, if given any state observed the total surplus to be allocated is strictly increasing in the USV, then the cake function (which maps from states into the total surplus) is identi…ed from the distribution of cake sizes, provided (i) the USV is independent of OSV and (ii) the bargaining protocol is independent of the cake sizes given observable states. In the second scenario with censored cake sizes, we show that when the cake function is additively separable in OSV and USV, it is nonparametrically identi…ed if the USV distribution is conditionally independent of a subvector of OSV, or has multiplicative heterogeneity.
In the third scenario with unobservable cake sizes, we …rst note that earlier, known results for identifying optimal stopping problems apply to our setting. In particular, Berry and Tamer (2006) showed an additively separable cake function is identi…ed if the USV is conditionally independent of all past states given any contemporary OSV, and if the USV distribution is known to econometricians. However, our main contribution under this data scenario is to relax the unrealistic assumption of known USV distribution, and show partial identi…cation of counterfactual outcomes (i.e. probability for reaching an agreement conditional on the OSV) is possible under nonparametric shape restrictions of the cake function and independence of USV from OSV. Our approach is motivated by the fact that in practice researchers often know the cake function satis…es certain shape restrictions derived exogenously from economic theory, or common senses. For example, expected market value of a portfolio of foreign assets must be monotone in exchange rates holding other state variables …xed. We argue such knowledge can be exploited to at least con…ne rationalizable counterfactual outcomes to an informative subset of the complete outcome space, with the aid of stochastic restrictions such as independence of USV from OSV. To our knowledge, this is the …rst positive result in identifying counterfactuals in a structural optimal stopping model without assuming knowledge of the USV distribution. We propose a simple but novel algorithm to recover the complete set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes (RCO), which are de…ned as outcomes in a counterfactual context that are consistent with players' dynamic rationality, the shape and stochastic restrictions of the model, as well as the actual outcomes observed in the data. We use numerical examples to show the set of RCO recovered can be quite informative and small relative to the complete outcome space.
We also address the identi…cation of two extensions of the canonical model of stochastic bargaining where the players evaluate the cake according to a concave utility function, or the discount factors are heterogeneous across players. 5 We show that if players across all bargaining games in the data are known to follow strategies that lead to the same pro…les of expected stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) payo¤s, then heterogenous discount rates and utility functions can both be identi…ed in the case with complete data under fairly weak restrictions on players'risk attitudes. 6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the canonical model of stochastic sequential bargaining and characterizes players'payo¤s in stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present identi…cation results in each of the three scenarios with di¤erent data availability. Section 6 studies identi…cation in extensions of the canonical model with concave utility functions or heterogenous discount rates. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are included in the appendix.
The Canonical Model of Stochastic Bargaining
Consider an in…nite-horizon bargaining game with K 2 players (denoted as i = 1; :; K) who share the same discount factor 2 (0; 1). In each period (indexed by t), all players observe a vector of states S t with support S R D S where D S denotes the dimension of S. (Throughout the paper, we use upper case letters for random variables and lower case letters for their realizations. We use R to denote the support of a generic random vector R, and R t to denote its history up to, and including, period t, i.e. R t fR 1 ; R 2 ; :; R t g.) The set of feasible utility vectors to be allocated in period t with realized state s t is given by C(s t ) = fu 2 R K :
+ is the "cake function". 7 In each period t, the order of moves among players is 5 In the terminology of Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) , these are stochastic bargaining games with non-transferable utility, which typically have multiple equilibria. 6 In either of the two cases, the pro…les of SSPE payo¤s for players are not unique in general. The single-SSPEpayo¤ assumption above is analogous to the "single-equilibrium" assumption used in the estimation of simultaneous games with incomplete information. Such assumptions allow econometricians to link model structures to observable distributions using theoretical characterizations of Bayesina Nash equilibria (BNE) or (SSPE payo¤s), while remaining agnostic about which BNE (or SSPE payo¤) is realized in the data-generating process. 7 This environment assumes that the players have time-separable quasi-linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over the commodity space and that a good with constant marginal utility to each player (e.g., money) can be freely transferred. In the terminology of Merlo and Wilson (1995,1998) , this environment is de…ned as a stochastic bargaining model with transferable utility.
given by a permutation of f1; 2; :; Kg, denoted as t , whose i-th coordinate t;(i) is the identity of the player who makes the i-th move. Let denote the set of all possible permutations of the K-vector. Let t t;(1) denote the proposer in period t. The transition of states and the order of moves satisfy the following restriction.
CI-1 (Conditional independence of histories) Conditional on S t , (i) t is independent of past states and orders of moves fS t 1 ; t 1 g, and (ii) S t+1 is independent of t and history fS t 1 ; t 1 g.
The assumption CI-1 is a rather weak restriction that can be satis…ed in lots of empirical contexts. For example, suppose the order of moves in each period t is determined by a function (S t ; t ), where t consists of noises excluded from S t and unobservable both to players and to econometricians. Then conditions in CI-1 are satis…ed if (i) given S t , t is independent of fS t 1 ; t 1 g and (ii)
given S t , S t+1 is independent of t and fS t 1 ; t 1 g. Condition in (i) does rule out the case where players take deterministic, alternating turns to make o¤ers. Under CI-1, the transition between information variables is reduced tõ
Throughout the paper, we maintain that both the …rst-order Markov transition between states H t (:j:) and the conditional multinomial distributionL t are time-homogenous. Thus we will drop the subscript t from (L; H), and use (R; R 0 ) to denote random vectors in the current and the next period respectively when there is no confusion.
The game is played as follows. At the beginning of each period, players observe the realized states s and the order of moves ( (1) ; :; (K) ) in that period. The proposer (1) then chooses to either pass or propose an allocation in C(s). If he proposes an allocation, player (2) responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal. Each player then responds in the order prescribed by until either some player rejects the o¤er or all players accept it. If no proposal is o¤ered and accepted by all players, the game moves to the next period where a new state s 0 and an order of moves 0 are realized according to the Markov processH. The procedure is then repeated except that the set of feasible proposals is given by C(s 0 ) in the new period. This game continues until an allocation is proposed and accepted by all players (if ever). Parameters (H; c;L; ) are common knowledge among all players but not known to econometricians. LetS t (S t ; t ) denote the information revealed to players in period t, and letS t denote the history of information from the initial period 0 up to period t. Given any initial stateS 0 = (s; ), an outcome ( ; ) consists of a stopping time and a random k-vector that is measurable with respect toS such that
(Note the set of feasible allocations is independent of the order of moves.) Given a realization of (s 0 ;s 1 ;s 2 ; ::) withs t (s t ; t ), denotes the period in which a proposal is accepted, and denotes the proposed allocation which is accepted in state s when the order of moves is . For a game starting with state s and order of moves , an outcome ( ; ) implies a von Neumann-Morgenstern payo¤ to player i, i.e. E[ ;i jS 0 = (s; )].
A stationary outcome is such that 9 a measurable subsetS( ) S S; and a measurable function :S( ) ! R k such that (i)S t 6 2S( ) for all t = 0; 1; :; 1; (ii)S 2S( ); and (iii) = (S ). That is, no allocation is implemented until some state and order of moves (s; ) 2S( ) is realized, in which case a proposal (s; ) 2 C(s) is accepted. Using property (iii), we let v (s; ) E[ (S )jS 0 = (s; )] denote the von-Neumann-Morgenstern payo¤ vector given initial state and order of moves (s; ). It follows from the de…nition of stationary outcome that v (s; ) = (s; ) for all (s; ) 2S( ) and v (s; ) = E[ (S )jS 0 = (s; )] for all (s; ) 6 2S( ). Alternatively we denote a stationary outcome by (S( ); ; ). A history up to a period t is a …nite sequence of realized states, orders of moves, and the actions taken at each state in the sequence up to period t. A strategy for player i speci…es a feasible action at every history at which he must act. A strategy pro…le is a measurable k-tuple of strategies, one for each player. At any history, a strategy pro…le induces an outcome and hence a payo¤ for each player. A strategy pro…le is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if, at every history, it is a best response to itself. We refer to the outcome and payo¤ functions induced by a subgame perfect strategy pro…le as an SPE outcome and SPE payo¤ respectively. A strategy pro…le is stationary if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on the current state and current o¤er. A stationary SPE (SSPE) outcome and payo¤ are the outcome and payo¤ generated by a subgame perfect strategy pro…le which is stationary. Let v i : S; ! R 1 + denote SSPE payo¤s for player i = 1; :; K, and w = P K i=1 v i denote total SSPE payo¤s of all players in the bargaining games. Let F K denote the set of bounded measurable functions on S; taking values in R K . Lemma 1 collects main results characterizing agents' behaviors and outcomes in SSPE of the bargaining game.
Lemma 1 Suppose CI-1 holds. Then (a) f 2 F K is a unique SSPE payo¤ if and only if A(f ) = f where for all (s; ) 2 S; ,
(b) the SSPE total payo¤ w is independent of given s, and solves The proof uses results in Theorems 1-3 in Merlo and Wilson (1998) and exploits conditions in CI-1 to show that the total payo¤ in SSPE and the occurrence of agreement are independent of the order of moves conditional on realized states. This important property of SSPE is instrumental for some of the positive identi…cation results below. Econometricians are interested in recovering the parameters (H; c;L; ) underlying the bargaining game using the distribution of states and decisions of o¤ers/acceptances observed. The data report players'proposals and decisions in a large number of bargaining games. In each period, the state variable S consists of X 2 X R D X (which is observed by players and econometricians) and 2 R 1 (which is only observed by players but not econometricians). For each of the bargaining games, econometricians observe time to agreement after the initial period, the identity of the proposer and observable states X in every period, but not . In this paper, we discuss identi…cation of the model under di¤erent scenarios where cake sizes and agreed proposals may or may not be observable in the data. A typical structural approach for inferring parameters from observables posits that all bargaining games observed in the data share (i) the same transition of states (given by the conditional multinomial distributionL and the Markov process H in (1)); and (ii) the same cake function c : S ! R 1 . Furthermore, the players in all observed bargaining games follow SSPE strategies.
In practice, data may report cross-sectional variations in the number of players K and their individual characteristics Z K , where Z K (Z 1 ; :; Z K ) with Z i 2 R J for i = 1; :; K. Such pro…les of individual characteristics vary across bargaining games observed in the data, but remain the same throughout each given game. Of course the primitives (H; c;L) may also depend on (K; Z K ). These individual characteristics are perfectly observable in data and …xed over time, and our identi…cation arguments throughout the paper are presented as conditional on (K; Z K ). We suppress dependence of structural elements c,L, H and the distributions of (X; ) observed on the vector (K; Z K ) only for the sake of notational simplicity.
Identi…cation with Complete Data
In this section we consider identi…cation of the cake function and the common discount rate in the canonical stochastic bargaining model when econometricians observe a complete history of (i) observable states X t and sizes of the cake Y t = c(X t ; t ) (but not t ); (ii) whether a unanimous agreement is reached in period t (denoted by a dummy variable D t ); and (iii) the order of moves and the identity of the proposer (denoted t ) in each period throughout the bargaining game. Econometricians also observe the division of the cake when an agreement occurs (denoted
+ where is the termination period in which an agreement is reached), but may not observe details of the proposal in any period when no agreement is reached. We shall show that with such complete data, all model primitives can be identi…ed under fairly weak, stochastic restrictions on state transitions and shape restrictions on the cake function. For any two generic random vectors R 1 ; R 2 , we use F R 2 jR 1 to denote distribution of R 2 conditional on R 1 . Let F X 0 denote the initial distribution of observable states X 0 at the start of the bargaining game, and let X denote its support. We maintain the following restrictions on the transition between states throughout this section.
CI-2 (C.I. of unobservable states) (i) Conditional on X t+1 , t+1 is independent of (X t ; t ) for all t; and (ii) conditional on X t , X t+1 is independent of t for all t.
The condition CI-2 requires dynamics between current and next period's states S and S 0 to be captured by persistence between observable states X and X 0 only. Let G X 0 jX denote transitions between X and X 0 , and F jX denote the conditional distribution of the unobservable state given X. Then CI-2 implies for all t,
This assumption appears in a wide range of structural dynamic models in industrial organization and labour economics (e.g. Rust (1987) ). An important implication of CI-1,2 is that conditional on X t , (S t+1 ; t+1 ) are jointly independent of t . 8 Throughout the paper, we maintain the regularity condition that for all t and
( ; c;L jS ; F jX ) remain to be identi…ed, while both the OSV transition G X 0 jX and the distribution of initial states X 0 can be directly recovered from data. De…ne a feature (:) as a mapping from a vector of parameters to some space of features. For example, ( ) can be a subvector of ( ; c;L jS ; F jX ), or some functional of c or F jX . Below we give a formal de…nition of identi…cation with complete data under CI-1,2. in .
By de…nition, any feature of the truth ( ) that can be expressed in terms of observable distributions is identi…ed. Note observational equivalence and identi…cation with complete data are de…ned under assumptions CI-1,2 and any possible additional restrictions on parameters ( ; c;L jS ; F jX ). Our point of departure in discussing identi…cation is that the data-generating process (DGP) is correctly speci…ed with certain parameters under CI-1,2. This implicitly requires that the observable distributions necessarily satisfy testable restrictions implied by CI-1,2 (see the lemma below), so that the identi…cation region for the parameter (i.e. the set of such that
) is not vacuously empty.
Lemma 2 Suppose CI-1,2 hold. Then (a) a joint distribution of ( ; ; fX t ; Y t ; t g t=0 ) is generated 8 This is because
by some under SSPE only if
for all x t ; t and 1 t 1, and (iii) F Yt;Dt; t jXt and F t ; t jDt=1;Xt are time-homogenous (i.e. the same for all t 0); and (b) any two o:e: 0 if and only if they also generate the same static, time-homogenous conditional distributions F ;DjX , F Y jD=0;X; and F jD=1;X; almost everywhere on
Part (a) of the lemma summarizes the necessary testable restrictions on observable distributions under CI-1,2, while part (b) gives a simpler formulation of the conditions under which ; 0 are observationally equivalent.
MT (Monotonicity) Both c(x; ") and F jX=x (") are strictly increasing in " for all x 2 X .
Lemma 3 Under CI-1,2 and MT, the common discount factor is identi…ed.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Under CI-1,2, the ex ante total continuation payo¤ (i.e.
w (s) E[w(S 0 )js]) must be a function of x only, and does not depend on ". As a result, w (x) can alternatively be expressed as the unique solution of a "quasi-structural" …xed-point (QSFP) equation de…ned by the unknown and the distribution of (Y; D; X) observed. The pre…x "quasi-" here is intended to highlight that structural elements ; c; F jX enter the …xed-point formulation indirectly through distributions of (Y; D; X). The assumption MT is instrumental, as it ensures a one-to-one mapping between Y and given X. (The discount rate also enters the QSFP equation directly.) With observable distributions …xed from data, w as a solution to the QSFP equation is shown to be strictly monotone in . This implies the probability for reaching an agreement
is also strictly monotone in under MT, with distribution of (Y; D; X) observed and …xed from data. Therefore, is point-identi…ed.
Additional restrictions are necessary for identifying the cake function c, the proposer-choosing mechanismL jS , and the USV distribution F jX .
CI-3 (C.I. of order of moves) For all t, the order of moves t is independent of t given X t .
Condition CI-3 requires the order of moves realized in each period to be uninformative about unobserved states given X. (Among other things, the condition CI-3 is satis…ed if the order of moves is determined by a function (x; ) where is independent of conditional on X.) It implies Y t = c(S t ) is independent of t conditional on X t . As Lemma 1 shows, occurrence of a unanimous agreement D t and the cake sizes Y t only depend on the current state S t realized but not on the identity of the proposer (i.e. the "separation principle" in Merlo and Wilson (1995) ). Hence CI-3 implies both Y t and D t are independent of the order of moves t conditional on X t . With this assumption,L jS = L jX and it is directly identi…ed from observable distributions along with ; G X 0 jX . Thus under CI-1,2,3, only (c; F jX ) remain to be identi…ed in the canonical stochastic sequential bargaining model. Our next result shows that, with ,L( jX) identi…ed, any two pairs (c; F jX ) and 0 (c 0 ; F 0 jX ) are observationally equivalent under CI-1,2,3 if and only if they generate the same joint distribution of cake sizes and observable states.
Proposition 1 Suppose CI-1,2,3 and MT hold. Then both ,L jX are identi…ed, and o:e: 0 if and
The proposition holds under weaker restrictions F (S t+1 ; t+1 jS t ) = F (S t+1 ; t+1 jX t ) and CI-3. 9 The intuition of the result is as follows. The occurrence of an agreement only depends on the evolution of cake sizes, which is independent of the order of moves conditional on X under the assumptions above. The order of moves only determines who receives the "gains to the proposer". 10 Under CI-1,2,3, L jX is identi…ed directly along with , and any rationalizable distribution of observables must necessarily satisfy SI (Statistical independence) t are i.i.d. across bargaining periods and independent from X t .
Let
P M S denote the set of satisfying MT and SI. Let~ (c;F ) and (c; F ) denote any two generic pairs of structural elements in M S . 9 With the addition of CI-3, the testable restrictions for observable distributions in (2) is strengthened to
1 0 Without CI-3, the result of the proposition would be " o:e: 0 if and only if
To …nd out what normalizations are innocuous for identi…cation, we would need to introduce further structures on how the distribution of is related to Y given X. for ;~ 2 P
M S
if and only ifc(x;") = c(x; g 1 (")) andF (") = F (g 1 (")) for some increasing function g; and (b) (c; F jX ) are identi…ed if c( x; ") = " for some x and all ".
Given the result in Proposition 1, both parts follow immediately from Matzkin (2003). Part (a) implies at least a normalization of the unobserved state is necessary to attain identi…cation of the cake function, even with …xed and known and restricted to be independent from X. In part (b), the assumption MT guarantees the mapping between the cake size and the USV (latent disturbance) is one-to-one for any x. Then assumption SI ensures F is just-identi…ed as F (t) = F Y jX= x (t) under the normalization c( x; ") = " for some x and all ". It then follows c is identi…ed as c(
Incomplete Data with Censored Cake Sizes
In this section, we discuss identi…cation of the canonical stochastic bargaining model when the size of the cakes and the accepted proposals can only be observed under a unanimous agreement. In such a case, theory predicts the distribution of cake sizes observed is censored at the expected present value of total continuation payo¤s for all players in SSPE (i.e. E[w(S 0 )js]). As in the case with complete data in Section 3, the common discount factor can be recovered from joint distribution of observable states, stopping times and agreed allocations under CI-1,2. Hence, we treat as identi…ed throughout this section. The major theme of this section is that additional restrictions on the cake function (i.e. additive separability in X and ) and the unobservable state distribution (such as multiplicative heterogeneity or distributional exclusion restriction) are su¢ cient for identi…cation of the cake function despite the loss of information about cake sizes when no agreement is reached.
Identi…cation under multiplicative heterogeneity
We start with a class of models where unobservable state variables (USV) are known to belong to a "location-scale" family. This subsumes zero-mean normally distributed USV with variance depending on observable states.
AS (Additive Separability) The cake function is given by c(x; ") =c(x) + " for all s 2 S . 1 1 Matzkin (2003) also noted that a slight extension of the identi…cation arguments above suggests c can be identi…ed when (i) X (X0; X1) with independent of X1 conditional on X0; and (ii) c(x; ") is normalized by letting c(x0; x1; ") = " for all x0; ". MH (Multiplicative Heterogeneity) (i) For all t, the disturbance t = (X t )~ t , where~ t is i.i.d. across bargaining games and all periods, independent of the process of observable states fX t g +1 t=0 , has median 0, and positive densities over R 1 ; (ii) The scale function (X) is continuous, strictly positive and bounded on X .
MH implies the independence of t from history of states conditional on X t , therefore the discounted ex ante total SSPE continuation payo¤s w (S) E[w(S 0 )jS] must be a function of X only and does not involve . With identi…ed, w (X) E[w(S 0 )jX] can be fully recovered from observed distributions F Y;DjX and G X 0 jX . (Alternatively, w (X) can be simply identi…ed as the lower end of support of the cake sizes observed under unanimous agreements conditional on X.) Under AS, the distribution of the gains from being a proposer under state x (de…ned as Y Y w (X)) is identical to that of maxf (X) + ; 0g, where (x) c(x) w (x) should be intuitively interpreted as the conditional median of the proposer gains.
We then apply results in Chen, Dahl and Khan (2005) for censored regression models to identify the function of conditional median cake sizesc. The unbounded support condition in MH is stronger than necessary, as the identi…cation arguments only need that for all x 2 X , support of~ is large enough to ensure the gains to the proposer is greater than zero (and therefore unanimous agreements occur) with positive probability. The zero median is a location normalization necessary for identifying . Most importantly, the support condition and the location-scale speci…cation ensure the conditional quantiles of "normalized" cake sizes are linear in unknown parameters, i.e. q (Y jx) = (x) + (x)c for all x (where c is the -th quantile of~ ) for some close enough to 1. This linearity is crucial for attaining the identi…cation ofc. 
Proposition 2 (i) Under CI-1, AS, MH, RG and SG, is identi…ed, and bothc(X) and (X) are identi…ed on X from the distribution of cake sizes censored under unanimous agreements. (ii)
The condition SG can be tested using the conditional distribution F DjX .
Since AS and MH imply CI-2 and MT, the same arguments in Lemma 3 above suggest conditions CI-1 and MH guarantee the common discount factor can be uniquely recovered from observable distributions. With (and therefore w (x)) identi…ed, the rest of the identi…cation proof follows from Chen, Dahl and Khan (2005) . Condition SG guarantees can be identi…ed directly as M ed(Y jx) over + X , which happens with a positive probability. Condition RG are regularity conditions that guarantee (x) is bounded and continuous on X . This ensures the conditional quantiles q (Y jx) must be strictly positive for some greater than 1=2 and close enough to 1 even for all x 6 2 + X . By construction, for such values of , q (Y jx) must also be positive for all x 2 X . Under SG, we can recover these high quantiles of unobservable states (i.e. c ) through a linear system that relates the conditional quantiles of cake sizes to (x), (x) and c for x 2 + X . Knowledge of these high quantiles c are used to identify (x) and (x) for x 6 2 + X using the equation q (Y jx) = (x) + (x)c for close enough to 1. The major identifying restriction SG is testable, as the event " (x) > 0" is equivalent to "Prf > (x)jxg > 1 2 " with having strictly positive densities around 0, and M edian( jx) = 0 for all x 2 X . Therefore, this condition is equivalent to PrfPr(D = 1jX) > 1 2 g > 0 and can be tested using observable distributions.
Identi…cation under exclusion restriction
While contributing to identi…cation ofc, multiplicative heterogeneity of also restricts the set of observable distributions that are consistent with the canonical model of stochastic bargaining. In particular, the MH assumption has stringent restrictions on conditional quantiles of the gains to the proposer given X. For any pair of observable states fx k g 2 k=1 and any four percentiles f j g 4 j=1 such that q j (y jx k ) > 0 for j = 1; 2; 3; 4 and k = 1; 2, the ratio between conditional interquantile range of the cakes must be independent of realized states. That is,
In this subsection, we consider alternative identifying assumptions that would avoid such a stringent restrictions on observable distributions.
ER (Exclusion restriction) X = (X 0 ; X 1 ) and is independent of X 1 given X 0 in each period.
RS (Rich support) has positive densities over R 1 conditional on all x 0 , and M edian( jx) = 0 for all x 2 X .
SG2 (Support of gains)
Proposition 3 Under CI-1,2, AS, RG, ER, RS and SG2, the discount rate is identi…ed and the cake functionc(X) is identi…ed on the support X .
AS, CI-1,2 guarantee the distribution of gains to the proposer is generated through a censored regression. (Now that MH is dropped, CI-2 needs to be stated explicitly.) Conditions CI-1,2 deliver the identi…cation of as before. In contrast with the case with MH, under ER the conditional quantiles of gains to the proposer Y Y w are additively separable in and the quantiles of the USV conditional on observable states. That is, q (Y jx) = (x) + c (x) for all x 2 X , where c (x) is an in…nite dimensional nuisance parameter. Conditions RG and RS ensure that is bounded on X while is not. Hence q (Y jx) > 0 holds even for x 6 2 + X provided is greater than 1=2 and close enough to 1. Conditions ER and SG2 allow us to …x any x 0 and exploit "enough" variations in x 1 alone to reach some statex (x 0 ;x 1 ) 2 + X . With a slight abuse of notation, note ER implies c (x) = c (x 0 ) for any 1=2, and these are recovered as q (Y jx) (x) with both components observed directly forx 2 + X . With knowledge of the nuisance parameter c (x 0 ) for any 1=2, (x) can be identi…ed for x 6 2 + X as q (Y jx) c (x 0 ) for some greater than 1=2 and close enough to 1. Thenc is recovered on X as the sum of and w (x). The exclusion restriction has some simple, testable restrictions on observable distributions:
for all ; 0 ; x;x such that minfq (x); q (x); q 0 (x); q 0 (x)g > 0 and x 0 =x 0 . We leave the construction of nonparametric estimators and discussion of their statistical properties for future work.
We conclude this section by noting that with identi…ed …rst,c is recovered from the censored distribution of cake sizes alone under the assumptions above. The distribution of allocations of the cake under agreements are not involved in the identi…cation ofc above. This is because of the additional identifying power from the independence ofc from the order of moves given the OSV, and the new structures imposed through the assumptions AS and MH or ER.
Incomplete Data with Unobservable Cake Sizes
In some other empirical contexts, econometricians can observe realized states in all periods and when a unanimous agreement is reached, but never observe the cake sizes, the order of moves, or the agreed allocations. For example, such a scenario arises when all parties involved in the game choose to keep details of negotiations and agreements con…dential, and outsiders (econometricians) only get to observe factors that are known to a¤ect the cake sizes. Econometricians seek to learn enough about the underlying structures (i.e. cake functions, distributions of the USV, etc) to predict probabilities for an agreement under counterfactual contexts (such as when the transition between states are perturbed). Suppose conditions CI-1,2 hold. Let denote the set of generic restrictions on unknown parameters ( ; c; F jX ). 12 1 2 Throughout this section, we maintain that the common discount factor is known to econometricians. Within the class of canonical models where players'utilities are transferrable, this restriction is often justi…able as the discount rate can usually be recovered exogenously. For example, in some empirical applications, the cake size is measured in monetary terms and the discount rate can be estimated as the interest rate that lasts throughout the bargaining process. under .
As in the canonical model with complete data, identi…cation is de…ned under conditional independence restrictions CI-1,2. In contrast with the previous scenarios, observational equivalence in the data scenario considered in this section only requires parameters to generate identical static, conditional probabilities of unanimous agreements F DjX only. This is because now neither the orders of moves nor the agreed allocations of the cake are observed in data. Our point of departure in discussion of identi…cation in this section is that the model is correctly speci…ed under CI-1,2 for some parameters ( ; c; F jX ;L jS ). Thus it is implicitly required that the distributions observed necessarily satisfy testable restrictions of these assumptions (i.e. F D t+1 ;X t+1 jD t ;X t = F D t+1 jX t+1 G X t+1 jXt , with F; G time-homogenous) so that the identi…cation region is not vacuously empty. Also note CI-3 (conditional independence of from given X) is dropped as the order of moves is not observed in the current scenario.
Identifying the cake function with known USV distribution
We start by examining what can be learned about model primitives in the simplest case where the distribution of USV is known to econometricians. Throughout this section, we maintain the AS assumption that the cake function is additively separable in states observed and USV, i.e. c(s) =c(x) " for some unknown functionc. The following lemma shows that at least some scale and location normalizations of F jX are required to identifyc, and such normalizations are innocuous for predicting counterfactual agreement probabilities.
Lemma 4 Under AS, CI-1,2, the location and scale of F jX cannot be identi…ed jointly withc.
This lemma is proved by showing that if the model is correctly speci…ed for some (c; F jX ), then any a¢ ne transformations (ac(x)+b; F jX ( " b a jx)) can also generate the same agreement probability Pr(D = 1jX) a.e. on X . The lemma implies that scale and locational normalizations of F jX are innocuous for predicting agreement probabilities under counterfactual changes in or G X 0 jX . To see this, simply note the a¢ ne transformations above are independent of the discount rate and the transitions between observable states. Thus for any given ( ; G), the same a¢ ne transformation of the true parameters (c; F jX ) is observationally equivalent to the truth both in the data-generating process (DGP) and in the counterfactual context of interest.
This also suggests the common assumption in empirical work that F jX is known to researchers is less restrictive than it seems. Consider the cases where distributions of unobserved states are known to be independent of X and belong to the normal family. Then restricting F jX to be N (0; 1) in estimation is equivalent to introducing a local and scale normalization that is innocuous. This is also true with other parametric families characterized by location and scale parameters only. Berry and Tamer (2006) showed a positive result in identifying optimal-stopping models when the USV distribution F jX is known to econometricians. Their result also applies in our context of canonical stochastic bargaining models.
Proposition 4 (Berry and
As shown in Section 2, theory suggests a "separation principle" where occurrence of a unanimous agreement only depends on states S realized but not on the identity of the proposer under SSPE. A bargaining game ends when the realized cake size exceeds the ex ante total continuation payo¤. Berry and Tamer (2006) showed with knowledge of the discount factor and the distribution of the USV, the optimal decision rule in dynamic stopping problems can also be fully recovered from conditional probabilities of agreements. This in turn helps identify the cake function. We adapt their proof in our context in the appendix.
Rationalizable counterfactual outcomes when USV distribution is unknown
When the unobservable state variable (USV) distribution is not known to belong to certain locationscale parametric family, imposing a speci…c form of F jX that deviates from the truth can imply incorrect results in counterfactual outcomes. (See the example in the next subsection.) On the other hand, economic theories often suggest the structural elements of the model have to satisfy certain nonparametric shape or stochastic restrictions (such as monotonicity or concavity of the cake function or independence of from X). This naturally raises the question: how can econometricians exploit such exogenously given restrictions to infer counterfactual outcomes without imposing parametric assumptions on the structure? We propose a simple, novel algorithm that helps recover the complete set of all rationalizable probabilities for reaching an agreement in counterfactual bargaining contexts where transitions between states are perturbed.
For the rest of this subsection, we maintain that is statistically independent of X (Assumption SI ). We begin by noting a pair of parameters (c; F ) is observationally equivalent to the true parameters if and only if the following equation is satis…ed:
where p(x) is the probability for reaching an agreement conditional on x, and w (x; p; F ) is the ex ante total continuation payo¤s in SSPE and solves the …xed point equation:
with
The latter will be referred to as the "conditional surplus function" (CSF) hereafter. Note the second equality in (4) uses the fact that p(x) = F (c(x) w (x)) For the rest of this subsection, we will focus on the case where the support of X is …nite.
DS (Discrete support)
The support of X (denoted X ) is …nite with M elements fx 1 ; x 2 ; :; x M g.
In discretized notations, a pair of parameters (c; F jX ) is observationally equivalent to the true parameters underlying the DGP if and only if the following system of M linear equations holds:
where Q,C, are M -vectors with Q m F 1 (p(x m )),C m c(x m ), and solves
where is a M -vector with the m-th coordinate de…ned as m (p(x m )), and G is the M -by-M transition matrix with the (m; n)-th entry de…ned as G mn Pr(X 0 = x n jX = x m ). Note the probabilities of reaching an agreement p (p(x 1 ); :; p(x M )) enters the system de…ning observational equivalence through . in both Q and . We shall normalize q(1=2) = 0 and (1=2) = for some strictly positive constant . (Note from our discussions in the previous subsection, such scale and location normalizations are innocuous for identifying counterfactual agreement probabilities wheñ c or G are perturbed.) Under this normalization,c(x) is the median cake size given state x.
In some empirical contexts, econometricians knowC satis…es certain shape restrictions that are derived exogenously from economic theory or common sense. Such restrictions can often be represented as a system of linear restrictions on the vectorC. For example, if the state x has three possible values x 1 < x 2 < x 3 andC is known to be strictly increasing and concave. ThenC is known to satisfy the linear restriction AC > 0 with Similar matrices of coe¢ cients can be constructed ifc is only known to be increasing or concave in one of the coordinates in a multivariate x. Besides, any ranking of a subset of the states byc(x) can also be represented as linear restrictions onC. For example, if a certain state x m is known to lead to the strictly smallest median size of the cake, this will lead to additional M 1 strict inequalities.
Given a set of exogenously given restrictions on the structureC and F jX , a vector of agreement probabilities p observed is rationalized if there existC; F jX such that (i)C; F jX satisfy these restrictions and (ii) p is generated as players make dynamic rational choices in SSPE givenC; F jX (i.e. p satis…es (5), (6) underC; F jX ). The next lemma gives su¢ cient and necessary conditions for a vector p to be rationalized whenC satis…es some linear restrictions and is independent of X. Let V (m) denote the m-th smallest element in a generic vector V . Let be any strictly positive constant.
Lemma 5 Suppose AS, CI-1,2 and DS, SI hold, is known and c(S) =c(X)
with M edian( ) = 0 for an unknown functionc that satis…es a set of linear restrictions AC > 0. Then a vector of the probability of agreements p observed in the DGP is rationalized if and only if the following linear system holds for some vectors Q; :
Q m Q n , p m p n ; 8m; n 2 f1; :; M g (8) 
Two remarks are in order. First, the feasibility of the linear system is not only necessary but also su¢ cient for a vector of agreement probabilities p to be rationalized in a model of stochastic bargaining. Su¢ ciency follows from the fact that when the linear system holds, a pair of structural elements (C; F ) can be constructed to rationalize p under CI-1,2, DS and SI as probability for agreements in SSPE. More speci…cally, such a F can be constructed through interpolations between Q (with its CSF satisfying constraints in (9)), andC = Q + (I G) 1 G . Second, without the shape restrictions AC > 0, the lemma would be vacuous in the sense that we would always be able to de…ne Q; recursively from any p 2 (0; 1) M and the linear system (8)- (11) , and then de…neC as above so that p is rationalized by (C; F ) under CI-1,2, DS and SI. In other words, without the shape restrictions AC > 0, any p in (0; 1) M must be rationalized by some (C; F ).
A standard approach for structural analyses of probabilities for agreements under counterfactual environments (such as perturbations in the state transitions or the cake function) would take two steps. First, identify and estimate the cake functionc and the USV distribution F using observable distributions from the DGP, and second, use the identi…ed parameters to predict the conditional probability of reaching agreements in the counterfactual contexts. Unfortunately, when the USV distribution is not restricted to take any known parametric form,c and F may not be uniquely recovered from observables, and the …rst step fails. This non-identi…cation is obvious from the lemma above, as the vector (Q; ) (i.e. the percentiles and the CSF corresponding to the USV distribution) that satis…es this linear system is not unique. For the rest of this section, we shall argue that, despite this non-identi…cation result, a simple algorithm can be used to recover all rationalizable conditional agreement probabilities under counterfactual contexts. These are counterfactual agreement probabilities consistent with the model structure and restrictions (including shape restrictions onc such as monotonicity, and stochastic restrictions on USV distribution such as independence of from X).
Below we formally de…ne rationalizable counterfactual outcomes. Suppose the data-generating process (DGP) is characterized by true parametersc 0 ; F 0 ; ; G 0 X 0 jX which generate conditional probabilities of agreement p 0 2 [0; 1] M observed in SSPE. We are interested in the probability for agreements under two types of counterfactual environments: (a) the transition between observable states is perturbed from G 0 X 0 jX to G 1 X 0 jX while ;c 0 ; F 0 are …xed; or (b) the cake function is changed toc 1 (x) c 0 (x) (x) (where (x) 2 R 1 ++ denotes percentage changes in the (median) cake size given state x), while G 0 X 0 jX ; F 0 remain the same. Suppose CI-1,2 hold, c(x; ") =c(x) " , and is …xed and known.
De…nition 3 Given certain restrictions on unknown structurec; F jX , the identi…ed set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes (ISRCO) consists of all conditional probabilities for agreement p 1 2 [0; 1] M such that (p 0 ; p 1 ) are jointly rationalized by somec; F jX that satis…es the restrictions.
The next proposition introduces a simple, new algorithm that recovers ISRCO. The basic idea extends the preceding lemma by synthesizing two linear systems characterizing rationalizability in two bargaining environments respectively (one observed and one counterfactual). This synthesis exploits the fact that the nuisance parameter F is …xed under both contexts. The observed and Proposition 5 Suppose the assumptions in Lemma 5 all hold. Then the ISRCO in (a) is the set of all p 1 such that the following linear system holds for some (Q j ; j ) j=0;1 : And the ISRCO in (b) is the set of all p 1 such that a similar linear system (13)- (16) and (17) is feasible with solutions (Q j ; j ) j=0;1 , where (17) is de…ned as
Thus recovering ISRCO amounts to collecting all p 1 in [0; 1] M such that [p 0 ; p 1 ] makes the linear system feasible with solutions in fQ j ; j g j=0;1 . Remarkably, this approach does not require any parametric assumption on the cake function or the USV distribution. On the other hand, it fully exploits the independence of and X and exogenously given shape restrictions "AC > 0". By construction, the ISRCO consists of all possible counterfactual outcomes that could be rationalized under the model restrictions (i.e. dynamic rationality, independence of of X and AC > 0).
We conclude this section by emphasizing that the ISRCO is interesting in its own right, regardless of its size relative to the outcome space [0; 1] M . This is because our approach e¢ ciently exhausts all information about the counterfactuals that can be extracted from known restrictions on the model. Thus the set reveals the limit of what can be learned about the probability for agreements under counterfactual contexts, if econometricians choose to remain agnostic about the functional form of the structural elements. In the next section, we illustrate the algorithm in a simple numeric example. The ISRCO recovered there is small relative to the outcome space and quite informative.
A simple numeric example
In this subsection, we use a simple numeric example to illustrate the consequence of normalizations (locational and scale) and misspeci…cations of the USV distributions on counterfactual analyses. We also use the example to illustrate the algorithm proposed in Proposition 5 for recovering the set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes.
(Counterfactual outcomes when the true distribution of USV is uniform and known) Suppose M = 3 and is independent of X with a true USV distribution F that is uniform on [ 5; 5] . Thus q(p k ; F ) = 10p k 5 and (p k ; F ) = 5p 2 k for p k 2 unif ) with the k-th coordinate being Pr(an agreement is reached jx k ). The subscript is a reminder that the counterfactual outcome is calculated using the assumed knowledge that the USV is uniform on [ 5; 5] . By de…nition, p 1 unif solves a system of quadratic equations
The solution is found to be p 
Straightforward substitutions show this misspeci…cation still leads to the same system of nonlinear equations in p 1 unif as (18) . In other words, even though Q unif (:), unif (:) andC unif have di¤erent forms now due to the misspeci…cation of F , the structure of the model is such that the di¤erences cancel out and yield the same system of nonlinear equations in (18) . (See the Appendix for algebraic details.) This veri…es our remarks earlier (following Lemma 4) that the scale and locational normalizations of the USV distribution is innocuous for recovering counterfactuals. 1 3 While choosing speci…cations of the example, we actually let p 0 be …xed at [ ] …rst, and then solve for C unif backwards by substituting p
, where the functional forms of Q unif ; unif are de…ned above. 1 4 See the Appendix for analytical close forms of the system of nonlinear equations. We use the "fmincon" function to solve for p 1 unif . The solution must be unique because givenc; F jX ; G X 0 jX , the ex ante total continuation payo¤ w is unique.
(Consequence of misspecifying USV distributions) Suppose ; G 0 ; G 1 are still de…ned as above, but now econometricians misspecify USV to be generalized log-logistic with a distribution function
with parameters = 0 (location), = 1 (scale), = 1 (shape). The distribution is positively skewed with support bounded below at 1. For any p = [p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ] 2 [0; 1] 3 , let Q GLL (p); GLL (p) denote R 3 -vectors with the k-th coordinate being the quantile and conditional surplus functions at p k , i.e.
respectively. Thus the conditional median cake function is recovered (incorrectly) from the observed p 0 as follows:C
Then the implied counterfactual outcome p 1 GLL must solve
Solving (18) with the right-hand side given byC GLL yields an implied counterfactuals p 1 GLL t [:5926; :1317; :2311], where the subscript GLL emphasizes this is the counterfactual outcome predicted under the misspeci…cation of the USV in structural estimation. 15 This implies misspecifying USV to be a general log-logistic while the truth in the DGP is uniform is not innocuous, as it induces discrepancies between the counterfactual outcomes it implies and the true counterfactual outcomes.
(Robust identi…cation of ISRCO without knowing the USV distribution) Now let the true ; G 0 underlying the DGP be de…ned as above, with F uniform on [ 5; 5] and the conditional median cake functionC =C unif . As before, the conditional agreement probability observed in data is p 0 = [ ]. Econometricians do not know the USV distribution F or the trueC. They only observe p 0 and know ; G 0 in the DGP, and are interested in predicting the counterfactual probabilities for agreements when the transition between states is changed to G 1 . Furthermore, econometricians correctly learn from outside the model that the second state yields the lowest static payo¤, i.e.c(x 2 ) < minfc(x 1 );c(x 3 )g. Then the algorithm proposed above can be used to recover the complete set of ISRCO by collecting all p 1 2 [0; 1] 3 that make the linear system (12)- (16) Our algorithm for recovering ISRCO only requires to be independent of X. The ISRCO is exhaustive and sharp in the following senses: (i) as long as the true USV distribution in the DGP satis…es this independence restriction and "C 2 < minfC 1 ;C 3 g", the true counterfactual outcomes under G 1 must lie in ISRCO; and (ii) any outcome vector in ISRCO is a rationalizable counterfactual outcomes corresponding to certain F that satis…es independence from X andC such that C 2 < minfC 1 ;C 3 g. Also note in implementing the algorithm we have invoked a location normalization (M edian( ) = 0) and a scale normalization ( (1=2; F ) = > 0), which are known to be innocuous for counterfactual analyses from Lemma 4 above.
Extensions
So far we have focused on a canonical stochastic bargaining model where players'utilities are linear in the surplus they receive, and all players share the same discount rate throughout the game. Lemma 1 shows the payo¤s in stationary subgame perfect equilibria is unique in such contexts. This section studies the identi…cation when players evaluate the surplus received according to a concave utility function, or the discount rates are di¤erent across players. In either of these two cases, players'payo¤s from SSPE are no longer unique in general. We shall show the utility function and the discount rates can be identi…ed with complete data on the occurrence of agreements and divisions of the cake under unanimous agreements, provided players across all bargaining games observed in the DGP adopt strategies that yield the same pro…le of SSPE payo¤s (which are functions of observable states). SE (Single equilibrium payo¤ ) Players in all bargaining games observed follow stationary subgame perfect strategies that lead to the same pro…le of SSPE payo¤ s (as functions of states).
This restriction is analogous to the "single-equilibrium" assumption used in the literature of estimating discrete games of incomplete information in the presence of multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria (e.g. Bajari, Hong, Krainer and Nekipelov (2008) and Tang (2009)). Such a "single-SSPE-payo¤" restriction allows econometricians to exploit the characterization of SSPE payo¤s in (5) and (6) to relate observable distributions to model primitives, without the need to specify which SSPE payo¤ is followed by players in the games observed.
Concave Utility Functions
In this subsection, we extend the basic model with complete information by relaxing restrictions of transferable utilities. The set of feasible allocations is now given by C(s) = ft 2 R K :
Econometricians observe the cake sizes, the identity of the proposer, and the physical shares of the cake for each player when a unanimous agreement occurs, but do not know the utility levels associated with these shares. The lemma below characterizes the SSPE payo¤s in this model.
Lemma 6
Suppose CI-1 holds. Then (a) v 2 F K is a SSPE payo¤ in the bargaining game with nontransferable utilities (NTU) if and only if A(v) = v where for alls = (s; ) 2 S and for all i,
(b) For any SSPE payo¤ v 2 F K , a unanimous agreement occurs in state s when the proposer is i if and only if, u c(s)
When an agreement occurs, the o¤ er made to a non-proposer j is u 1 ( E[v j (S 0 )jS = s]), and player j accepts if and only if the share o¤ ered is greater than
The proof follows from Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson (1995) and uses conditions in CI-1 to show the ex ante individual SSPE continuation payo¤s are independent from the order of moves in the current period, i.e.
Identi…cation of the utility function is possible if we exploit observations of the division of cakes observed, and if the utility function is restricted to belong to a particular class of utility functions.
PA (Possibility of agreement) For all x 2 X and (1) 2 f1; 2; :; Kg, Pr(D = 1jx; ) > 0.
PS (Parameter space)
The parameter space for utility function (denoted U ) is such that (i) u 0 > 0, u(0) = 0 for all u 2 U ; and (ii) for all u;ũ 2 U ,ũ = g u where g is a strictly concave or convex function (possibly depending on u;ũ).
Assumption PA ensures that for all values of x there is positive probability of reaching an immediate agreement. This is important, as the link between utilities and physical shares exists only when a unanimous agreement occurs. Assumption PS allows us to use Jensen's inequality repeatedly to prove by contradiction that the observational equivalence of two utility functions u;ũ fails under the assumptions above. A corollary of the proposition is that u is identi…ed within the classes of increasing functions with either constant absolute risk aversions (CARA) or constant relative risk aversions (CRRA) respectively and u(0) = 0. To see this, suppose u 1 ; u 2 are both di¤erentiable CARA functions with
h 0 (x) denote the absolute risk aversion for a function h. Then algebra shows R a (g) = R a (u 2 ) R a (u 1 ). Both R a (u 2 ) and R a (u 1 ) are constant by our supposition, and g 0 > 0 by condition (i) in PS. Hence g 00 must be either strictly positive or strictly negative over its whole support. It follows the class of increasing CARA functions with u(0) = 0 satis…es PS. Likewise, we can also show u is identi…ed within the class of increasing CRRA functions with u(0) = 0.
Heterogenous Discount Factors
Now consider another extension where each player i in the bargaining game has a di¤erent discount factor i . The lemma below characterizes the SSPE payo¤s in this case.
Lemma 7 Suppose CI-1 holds. Then f 2 F K is a SSPE payo¤ if and only if A(f ) = f where for all (s; ) 2 S; ,
The proof of this lemma follows from similar arguments in Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson (1998), and is omitted for brevity. With heterogenous discount factors, additional information from observed divisions of cakes under agreements must be exploited to recover individual i .
Theory predicts in any SSPE, a non-proposer always receives a share that is equal to his individual ex ante continuation payo¤ when an agreement is reached. Analogous to Lemma 3, the basic idea underlying the identi…cation of individual i is to show there exists a strictly monotone mapping between individual discount rates and observed shares for a non-proposer, once the observable distributions of (Y; D; X) are controlled for.
Proposition 7 Under CI-1,2,3, SE, MT and PA, the discount factors f i g K i=1 are identi…ed.
As before, MT ensures there exists a one-to-one mapping between Y and . PA ensures that for any i, his share of the cake when an agreement is reached under someone else's proposal can be observed as a function of x. SE ensures the observable distribution of (Y; D) is rationalized by a single SSPE, rather than a mixture of distributions rationalized in each of the multiple SSPE due to heterogenous i . Then the probability of agreements and agreed shares of the cake can still be related to discount rates as theory predicts in Lemma 7. 16 Lemma 3 and Proposition 7 di¤er in that the former only uses the distribution of total cake sizes and the probability of unanimous agreements while the latter also exploits actual allocations under agreement. This di¤erence comports with the intuition that when discount rates are heterogenous among players, econometricians need to exploit more information from observables to identify the vector of individual i 's. In fact, the homogenous in Lemma 3 is over-identi…ed in the sense that observing the total cake size alone is su¢ cient for identifying the single , while econometricians get to observe a K-vector of agreed non-proposer shares conditional on X. Each coordinate in the K-vector contains enough information for identifying .
Conclusion
In this paper we present positive results in the identi…cation of structural elements and counterfactual outcomes in stochastic sequential bargaining models under various scenarios of data availability. A unifying theme throughout the paper is that, in the absence of parametric assumptions on model structures, the model and its counterfactuals can still be point-or informatively partially-identi…ed under fairly weak nonparametric restrictions (such as shape restrictions on the cake function or stochastic restrictions on the unobservable states), depending on data availability.
We conclude by mentioning some interesting directions for future research. First, in this paper, we have not addressed the de…nition of estimators or their asymptotic properties. Second, our point of departure in this paper is a group of conditional independence restrictions CI-1,2,3. Under these assumptions and conditional on current observable states, the cake sizes are independent of histories of states, and the order of moves in each period reveals no information about unobserved states or cake sizes. These assumptions are instrumental to our discussion of identi…cation, but also imply speci…c restrictions on observable distributions. 17 Directions for future research includes identi…cation when these conditional independence restrictions are relaxed, so that cake sizes or the agreed allocations are allowed to be correlated with the order of moves given states observed.
8 Appendix:
Part A: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows from Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson (1998) that the individual SSPE payo¤ is characterized by . Note under CI-1, for any function h of (S; ),
where the …rst equality follows from the law of total probability, the second follows from condition (i) in CI-1, and the third follows from condition (ii) in CI-1. Then (a), (b) and (c) in the lemma follows. The uniqueness of SSPE payo¤s is shown Theorem 3 in Merlo and Wilson (1998).
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (a): That players must exhaust the complete cake under agreements in SSPE is trivial. Under CI-1,2, F S t+1 ; t+1 jX t ; t =L t+1 jS t+1 F S t+1 jX t ; t =L t+1 jS t+1 F S t+1 jXt , where the …rst equality follows from the …rst condition in CI-1 and the second follows from the second condition in CI-1 and both conditions in CI-2. 18 Note Y t is determined by S t only and, due to the "separation principle", D t is also determined by S t alone in SSPE. Therefore in SSPE, (Y t+1 ; D t+1 ; X t+1 ; t+1 ) is determined by ( t+1 ; X t+1 ; t+1 ) and must be jointly independent of ( t ; X t 1 ) conditional on X t , and F Y t+1 ;D t+1 ; t+1 ;X t+1 jX t ; t = F Y t+1 ;D t+1 ; t+1 jX t+1 ;Xt G X t+1 jXt . But note F t+1 ; t+1 jX t+1 ;Xt =L t+1 jS t+1 F t+1 jX t+1 under CI-1,2. Hence (Y t+1 ; D t+1 ; t+1 ) must be independent of X t given X t+1 , and (2) holds under SSPE. To show (3), it su¢ ces to note the division of the cake under a unanimous agreement t+1 is completely determined by S t+1 , t+1 and the parameters in . (In fact only the identity of the proposer t+1;(1) matters.) The time-homogeneity of F Yt;Dt; t jXt and F t ; t jDt=1;Xt follows from the time-homogeneity ofL jS and H S 0 jS = F 0 jX 0 G X 0 jX , which we maintain throughout the paper.
Part (b):
Given that the initial distribution of X 0 is identi…ed, any ; 0 that generate the same F ;DjX , F jD=1;X; must also by de…nition generate the same joint distribution of observables with = 0. Now consider the case = 1. Then
where the second equality follows from CI-1,2 again. Recall G X 0 jX is directly recovered from observables, and by our supposition, ; 0 generate the same conditional distributions 
under CI-1,2. By our supposition at the beginning of this induction step, ; 0 generate the same …rst and last terms in the product.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note Pr(D = 1jx) = Pr fY w (x)jxg = 1 F Y jX ( w (x)), where w (s) E[w(S 0 )jS = s] is the ex ante total continuation payo¤ for all players in SSPE, which obviously depends on structural elements ( ; c; F jX ; G X 0 jX ). Under CI-1,2, w must be a function of X only. Let p(x) Pr(D = 1jx). By construction, w (x) solves the …xed point equation:
where
is strictly increasing for all x due to MT. Hence the function can be expressed in terms of observable distributions as
This in turn implies the true w (x) can be alternatively represented as a solution to the following "quasi-structural" …xed-point equation: f = T (f ; ; p; F Y jX ), where
The "quasi-" pre…x is intended to highlight that structural elements ( ; c; F jX ; G X 0 X ) all enter (24) indirectly through observed p, F Y jX . It is easy to see that with~ bounded and continuous, (i) T (f + c) T f + c for < 1 and all c 2 R 1 ++ ; and (ii) f 1 f 2 implies T (f 1 ) T (f 2 ). Hence the operator T is a contraction mapping when < 1 with~ . More generally, let^ w denote the unique solution for^ w = T (^ w ;^ ; p; F Y jX ), with p; F Y jX being observed from the data generating process (DGP) but^ being any generic discount rate. That is,^ may be any element in (0; 1) that di¤ers from the true discount rate . Recursive substitutions of (24) show that^ w (x;^ ; p; F Y jX ) must be strictly increasing in^ with p; F Y jX …xed from data observed. 19 Hence^ ^ w (x;^ ; p; F Y jX ) must also be strictly increasing in^ for all x. It then follows that the true discount rate is identi…ed as inff^ :^ ^ w (x;^ ; p;
where we have also used the fact that F Y jX is strictly increasing in y for all x under MT. 1 9 To see this, note (24) can be written as^
where Gf R f (x 0 )dG X 0 jX and If = f for bounded continuous f . That I ^ G is invertible follows from the fact that G is a Markov transition and^ 2 (0; 1). Then
and^ w must be increasing in^ with~ …xed from observable distributions and known to be positive by de…nition.
Proof of Proposition 1. Necessity follows from the de…nition of observational equivalence. For su¢ -ciency, results from Lemma 2 suggests it su¢ ces to show F Y;DjX ( ) = F Y;DjX ( 0 ) and F jD=1;X; ( ) =
(Recall is independent of conditional on X, and L jX is directly identi…ed from data.) Let ( 1 ; :; K ) denote the vector of ex ante continuation payo¤s for players (1; :; K) in SSPE by
where v i is player i's SSPE payo¤ (with its dependence on suppressed for notational ease), 0 is the identity of the proposer in the next period andS( ) denotes the subset of S; such that c(s) P i i (s; ). Our proof of su¢ ciency uses Lemma A1 below.
Lemma A1: Suppose CI-1,2,3 hold. Then (i) the vector of ex ante continuation payo¤ in SSPE is independent of unobserved states and the order of moves given x (i.e. (s; ; ) = (x; )) for all s 2 S and any ; (ii) for any ; 0 such that
Proof: To prove (i), note is the solution to the …xed point equation = ( ; ), where the i-th coordinate of is given by i (s; ; )
where 1( ) is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if and only if the event is true. Under CI-1,2, (S 0 ; 0 ) is independent of and conditional on X. 20 Then it follows for any function h of (S; ),
Hence only maps into the space of functions that are independent of and the order of moves conditional on x. The usual …xed point arguments show solutions to = ( ; ) exist and must be independent of given x (i.e. must be a function of x but does not involve or ).
To prove (ii), let q i (x) Pr( = ijx) (which is directly identi…ed from observables) and note 2 0 To see this, it su¢ ces to note under CI-1,2, we have (with a slight abuse of notation):
the result in (i) implies components in (26) can be represented as
where the …rst equality follows from Y = c(S) and CI-1,2 and MT as before and the second follows from CI-3. Besides,
where the …rst equality follows from CI-1,2 as above and the second from CI-3. Finally,
Hence given any and with G X 0 jX ; L jX (and therefore fq i (:)g k i=1 ) directly recovered from observables in data, the ex ante continuation payo¤s depend on c and F jX only through F Y jX , as is seen in the derivation of the …xed point equation = ( ; ; G X 0 jX ; F Y jX ; L jX ) above. Therefore for any pair ; 0 such that F Y jX ( ) = F Y jX ( 0 ) a.e. on X , we have
a.e. on X . This completes the proof of Lemma A1. Q.E.D.
Recall for any y 2 R 1 + , X = x,
Hence this conditional probability of reaching an agreement is a functional of ( ; G X 0 jX ; F Y jX ; L jX ) only. Therefore for any ; 0 such that F Y jX ( ) = F Y jX ( 0 ) a.e. on X , we also have F Y;DjX ( ) = F Y;DjX ( 0 ) a.e. on X . It only remains to show F ;Y jD=1;X; ( ) = F ;Y jD=1;X; ( 0 ) a.e. on X . But whenever agreements occur, the proposer i o¤ers E[v j (S 0 )jS = s] j (x) to others, while claiming c(s) P j6 =i j (x) to himself. Therefore by Lemma A1, for any …xed x and with L jX observed directly from data, the joint distribution of the cake size and agreed allocations to all players are the same for any and 0 such that
Proof of Proposition 2. That is identi…ed follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that AS, MH implies CI-2, MT. Since MH implies conditional independence of from histories given X, we have
wherew(x) E[w(S)jX = x]. Note G X 0 jX is directly recovered from observables. With knowledge of ,w(x) can also be identi…ed from data as E[ P i ;i jX = x], where denotes the number of periods it takes to reach an agreement after state x is realized, and ;i = v i (s ; ) denotes the proposed allocation for player i accepted in state s . Note P i v i (s; ) = c(s) when agreement occurs under (s; ), since agreed proposals always exhaust the cake size. Therefore the right-hand side of (27) is identi…ed.
Since cake sizes are not reported when proposals are rejected, only censored values of c(s), denoted as y = maxf E[w(X 0 )jX = x]; c(s)g, is observed. Then the gains to the proposer in SSPE is:
Note w (s) is a function of x but not " under CI-1 and MH. Therefore the ex ante total continuation payo¤ w is the unique …xed point of a contraction mapping
And it maps from the space of continuous, bounded functions to itself. Hence w must also be continuous and bounded over X , and so is . The rest of proof of identi…cation follows from Chen and Khan (2005) , which relies on SG. To see SG is testable using observed distributions, note the event " (x) > 0" is equivalent to "Prf > (x)jxg > . By CI-1,2, w must be independent of " for all x, and
Under our supposition of the model speci…cation c(s) =c 1 (x) " and F 1 jX , this suggests SSPE continuational payo¤ under the …rst pair of speci…cations, denoted w;1 , must solve the …xed point equation in f :
Some algebra using change-of-variables shows the …xed point solutions under the alternative speci…cation (c 2 ; F 2 jX ) is w;2 (x) = a w;1 (x). Therefore 
Under AS, c(s) =c(x) ", and the formula can be written as
For any given F jX and p observed, the right hand side of (28) is a contraction mapping by standard arguments in the BS Theorem. Therefore with knowledge of F jX , p and G, w is uniquely recovered as the solution to the …xed point equation in (28) . Hencec is identi…ed with knowledge of F jX . The proof of (ii) follows almost immediately. When is unknown, w can be written as a monotone function of . We can solve the following equation given knowledge of F jX , p andc( x),
It then follows from the proof of (ii) that with knowledge of , the component in cake functionc can be identi…ed.
Proof of Lemma 5. (Necessity) Suppose a vector p is generated by some true parameters (c; F ) underlying the DGP such that AC > 0 and is independent of X with median 0. Then let
. It follows immediately from the substitution of (6) into (5), the independence of from X and the monotonicity of F that (7) and (8) must hold forQ;~ . The de…nition of and some straightforward algebra (involving the Leibniz rule for di¤erentiating integrals) suggest for any m; n,
which must be bounded between p n (Q m Q n ) and p m (Q m Q n ). Hence (9) holds forQ;~ .
Note (11) holds for~ by de…nition of the CSF , and (10) holds forQ;~ if is equal to the true CSF at 1 2 , i.e.~ (1=2; F ). More generally, if 6 =~ , the system (7)-(11) still holds for the scale multiplications ( =~ )Q and ( =~ )~ . (Su¢ ciency) We need to show that if (7)-(11) holds for some Q; then there must be a pair (c; F ) such that (i) is independent of X andc satis…es the shape restrictions; and (ii) (c; F ) generates p as the decision maker's dynamic rational choice probabilities. By supposition the linear system is feasible. Hence we can …nd such a F by choosing the p m -percentile F 1 (p m ) to be the solutions Q m and choosing (p(x m )) by …rst setting (1=2) = and then interpolating between F 1 (p m ) so that (p(x m )) is equal to the solution m . This is possible because the inequality restrictions (9) and (10) are satis…ed. A distribution constructed this way naturally satis…es the independence of X and M edian( ) = 0 due to the de…nition of the linear system (7)- (11) . Then de…neC = Q + (I G) 1 G and the pair (c; F ) satis…es both requirements (i) and (ii) above.
Proof of Proposition 5. The distribution of unobservable states F 0 is …xed in both the observed and the counterfactual environments. It su¢ ces to note that in type (a) counterfactual exercise, C = Q j + (I G j ) 1 G j j for j = 0; 1. And in type (b) counterfactual exercise,C = Q 0 + (I G 0 ) 1 G 0 0 while C = Q 1 + (I G 1 ) 1 G 1 1 . The rest of the proof follows from similar arguments in Lemma 5 and is omitted for brevity. where D t is the dummy for an agreement in period t and it is a function of S t but not t . Under CI-1,2,
That is, S 0 ; 0 are independent of ; conditional on X. Therefore is a function of X only. Hence (29) can be written as
Let q i (x) Pr( = ijx). Note the …rst term on the right-hand side can be written as
where the …rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and the second equality follows from the fact that under CI-1,2,3:
F 0 ; 0 jX 0 ;X = F 0 jS 0 ;X F 0 jX 0 ;X = F 0 jX 0 F 0 jX 0 Furthermore, under MT, Y is increasing in given X. Hence Z u c(S) P j6 =i u 1 ( j (X)) 1 c(S) 
And the third term is
Hence we can write = ( ; u; ; G X 0 jX ; F Y jX ) where is a R k -valued function with the i-th coordinate i de…ned as i (x; )
For notational ease, we suppress dependence of the …xed point equation on ( ; G X 0 jX ; F Y jX ). De…ne the physical share of the cake for a non-proposer i when an agreement occurs in state x as i (x) = u 1 ( i (x)). The assumption PA implies that for each individual i and observable state x, there is positive probability that an agreement is reached when i is not the proposer. Hence for each player i, i (x) is observed over the support X as the physical shares for player i when agreements occur and 6 = i in state s = (x; ").
De…ne y i y P j6 =i j (x) for all i. Alternatively, this can be written as
where p 1 (x) Pr(D = 1jx) and p 0 (x) 1 p 1 (x) and i (x; u)
We refer to (31) as a "quasi-…xed-point equation" for i (x). Compared with (30), (31) di¤ers in that it explicitly expresses how f i g k i=1 , p 1 and F Y jX;D=1 enter the …xed point equation. Though dependent upon the unknown true utility function u, these three functions are observable from data and therefore are held …xed in identi…cation arguments.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists u 6 =ũ in U and u 
It follows that for the distribution of cake size F Y jX observed, the same conditional distribution F Y jX;D is induced by both u;ũ. Supposeũ = g u for some strictly concave function g : R 1 + ! R 1 + . Then i (x;ũ) = i (x; g u) < g i (x; u) by concavity of g and the Jensen's Inequality. Also note i (x; u) = u 1 ( i (x; u)). Therefore for u o:e:ũ , u( i (x;ũ)) = Z q i (x 0 )p 1 (x 0 ;ũ) i (x 0 ;ũ) + q i (x 0 )p 0 (x 0 ;ũ) + 1 q i (x 0 ) ũ( i (x 0 ;ũ))dG(x 0 jx)
where the inequalities all follow from concavity of g and applications of Jensen's Inequality as well as (32) and (33). In addition, the last inequality also uses g(0) = 0 (implied by u(0) = 0 for all u 2 U ). This constitutes a contraction. The proof for the case withũ = h u for some strictly convex function h follows from symmetric arguments and is omitted for brevity. Hence / 9u 6 =ũ in Z maxfc(x 0 ; " 0 ) P j j f j (x 0 ); 0gdF jX=x 0 (" 0 )dG(x 0 jx)
